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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for the above captioned matter is conferred 
upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2A-3(2)(c). 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
WILFORD L. MCCULLOUGH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 90100-CA 
Appeal Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SALT LAKE CITY 
Appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Grant, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Wilford L. McCullough, was issued a citation on 
October 27, 1989, for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Defendant thereafter moved to suppress results of the Intoxilyzer 
test on the basis that the arresting officer lacked specific 
articulable facts which would lead a reasonable person to believe 
defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. The 
motion was denied, and defendant entered a conditional plea of 
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on 
the suppression motion. 
ISSUE 
Did the arresting officer have an articulable suspicion that 
defendant had committed or was about to commit crime? 
- i -
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate court "will not disturb the trial court's 
factual evaluation underlying its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See also State 
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); State v. Johnson, 771 
P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, "[t]he trial 
court's finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against the 
clear weight of the evidence or [the appellate court] reach[es] a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. OFFICER WILLIAMS' STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE ENCOUNTER, INASMUCH AS THE 
OFFICER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE OR MORE 
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. 
II. DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT ALSO PROVIDED THE OFFICER WITH A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE 
IMPAIRED. 
FACTS 
1. On October 27, 1989, at 12:50 a.m., Wilford McCullough 
was stopped at a red light at the intersection of 200 West and 
900 South in Salt Lake City. (T.5,6). 
2. When the light changed to green, Mr. McCullough failed 
to proceed through the intersection for approximately 30 seconds. 
(T.6) 
3. Officer Williams, Salt Lake City Police Department, 
observed the failure to proceed. (T.5) 
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4. Because the officer had probable cause to believe that 
a traffic violation had occurred and because the officer had a 
reasonable suspicion that McCullough may have been impaired, 
McCullough was stopped. (T.6,10,11). 
5. It was the officer's testimony that he had previously 
stopped motorists for such a violation. (T.10,11). 
6. Defense counsel specifically stated at the motion 
hearing he was not arguing that this was a pretextual stop. 
(T.27). 
ARGUMENTS 
I. OFFICER WILLIAMS' STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE ENCOUNTER, INASMUCH AS THE 
OFFICER HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE OR MORE 
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS HAD OCCURRED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged three categories of 
constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers 
and the public: 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer has an 
'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the 'detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
See also State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
- ^ -
"A stop which results from an officer actually observing a 
citizen commit a traffic violation would involve the officer 
having, at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen had 
committed a traffic offense. Thus, under the Deitman analysis, 
it would involve a level three stop." State v. Smith, 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 83, fn.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cit. 1984) (setting out the three 
levels of police encounters). 
As previously indicated, defendant does not claim this to be 
a pretextual stop, but that he did not violate* a traffic 
ordinance. (Trial Transcript at 27, hereinafter, T.27). Thus, 
this court need not reach the issue of whether Officer Williams 
had reasonable suspicion of a greater crime, i.e., DUI. (See 
State v. Smith, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at 85), but only whether he 
had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-104 requires vehicles stopping on a two way 
road to do so at the right hand curb. Defendant did not do so. 
Salt Lake City Code §12.36.030 , prohibits driving "a motor 
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of traffic..." See also State v. Seavey, 564 
A.2d 388 (Me. 1988). Stopping for 30 seconds at a green light is 
a sufficiently slow speed as to impede traffic. Salt Lake City 
2 
Code §12.56.050 , requires continuous movement. Defendant's 
movement was obviously not continuous. 
Adopted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §46-6-17, and consistent 
with §§46-6-23, 46-6-49, 46-6-103. 
2!d. 
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Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) 
is distinguishable, inasmuch as the officer in Thorsness did not 
have probable cause to believe there was a violation of the 
traffic law. Rather, this case is governed by Smith, supra. 
Officer Williams had probable cause to believe defendant violated 
a traffic law. 
Whether the defendant actually would be found guilty of such 
a violation is, of course, not the point: 
The court's rulings ... illustrate the difference in 
standards and latitude allowed in passing upon the distinct 
issues of probable cause and guilt. Guilt in a criminal 
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ... However, 
if those standards were to be made applicable in determining 
probable cause for arrest or for search and seizure ... few 
indeed would be the situations in which an officer, charged 
with protecting the public interest in enforcing the law, 
could take effective action toward that end. 
State v. Richards, 116 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 33 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Also see, State v. Bartley, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989): "In establishing probable cause, we deal not in 
certainties, but in 'probabilities.' The quantum of evidence 
needed for probable cause is significantly less than that needed 
to prove guilt. (Citations omitted). 
This analysis has been confirmed by other states. In 
McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. App. 1988), a police 
officer stopped the defendant for failure to dim his headlight. 
He noticed signs of impairment; defendant's blood alcohol level 
was shown to be .17. The defendant was acquitted of failure to 
dim headlights but convicted of DUI. On appeal defendant argued 
that since he was acquitted of failure to dim headlights, the 
- R -
arresting officer had no probable cause to believe that he had 
committed an offense. The Georgia court held that the officer's 
reasonable belief that an offense had been committed, though he 
may have been mistaken either as to fact to law, was yet a 
sufficient "founding suspicion" to enable the trial court to 
determine the stop was not mere arbitrariness or harassment. The 
stop was not lacking in reasonable cause or articulable suspicion 
and appellant was thus not entitled to a directed verdict of 
acquittal for lack of probable cause to stop. McConnell, 374 
S.E.2d 111, 113. 
II. DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT ALSO PROVIDED THE OFFICER WITH A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS DRIVING WHILE 
IMPAIRED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant's actions did not 
establish probable cause to believe there was a violation of the 
law, Thorsness is still distinguishable, as defendant 
McCullough's conduct in this case provided reasonable suspicion. 
The Thorsness court found that defendant's driving slowly past an 
accident at 1:30 a.m. and failing to move on "immediately" when 
directed to was not sufficient to establish a. reasonable 
suspicion of driving while impaired. While there is nothing 
"inherently untoward in a driver traveling under the speed limit 
or in stopping momentarily" at an accident (Thorsness, at 29), 
Mr. McCullough was not proceeding past an accident. There was 
nothing to attract his attention. Noting the standard of review, 
the trial court in the instant case agreed that it is unusual for 
a car, with the engine running, to wait a full 30 seconds at a 
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green light. This is far past the "honk the horn and make him 
go" time period. 
That there may be other possible explanations for 
defendant's failure to proceed is not the issue. The City is not 
required to eliminate any conceivable explanation of the conduct, 
but only demonstrate "an articulable suspicion" that the person 
has committed a crime. See State v. Menke, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990): "Defendant's actions, although conceivably 
consistent with innocent-albeit highly eccentric-activity, are 
also strongly indicative of shoplifting, especially in such close 
proximity to a shopping mall. It was reasonable for the officers 
to investigate the suspicious activity they observed." 128 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 32, 34. It was eminently reasonable for Officer 
Williams to investigate the specific articulable facts presented 
to him: Defendant's failure to proceed through a green light for 
a lengthy period of time during the early morning hours. 
CONCLUSION 
Officer Williams had probable cause to believe defendant 
violated one or more traffic laws by failing to proceed through 
the light. Additionally, this conduct provided a reasonable 
suspicion that defendant was impaired, either through fatigue or 
substance abuse. The trial court's determination should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this Zo day of May, 1990. 
AJ^A L / 
GLEN A. COOK, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
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12.56.050 CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT REQUIRED. 
When signs or traffic markings are erected or placed by the 
direction of the city, no person shall stop, stand or park a 
vehicle or permit said vehicle to remain standing at any 
time, with the exception or certain hours specified, upon 
any street, parts of a street, or roadway. 
12.36.030 DRIVING TOO SLOW. 
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such slow speed as 
to impede or block the normal and reasonable movement of 
traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe 
operation or to comply with law. 
41-6-16 MOTOR VEHICLES 550 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter — Ef-
fect of local ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and 
uniform throughout this state and in all of its politi-
cal subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority 
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in 
conflict with the provisions of this chapter. Local au-
thorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent 
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances 
which are not in conflict with this chapter. 1987 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities 
— Traffic-control device affecting state 
highway — Necessity of erecting traf-
fic-control devices. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent 
local authorities, with respect to highways under 
their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise 
of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, stand-
ing, or parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace offi-
cers or official traffic-control devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or as-
semblages on the highways; 
(d) designating particular highways or road-
ways for use by traffic moving in one direction 
under Section 41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in 
public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-48 re-
garding speed limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through 
highway or designating any intersection or junc-
tion of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or 
junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Sec-
tion 27-12-145; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and re-
quiring the registration and inspection of them, 
including requiring a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of ve-
hicles or specified types of vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under 
Section 41-6-48; 
(k) requiring written accident reports under 
Section 41-6-42; 
ft) designating no-passing zones under Section 
41-6-59; 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of con-
trolled-access roadways by any class or kind of 
traffic under Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily 
traveled streets by any class or kind of traffic 
found to be incompatible with the normal and 
safe movement rof traffic; 
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under 
Subsection 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play 
streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a 
highway in a business district or any designated 
highway except in a crosswalk under Section 
41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at un-
marked crosswalks under Section 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts; 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, 
sleds, skateboards, and other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or ex-
perimental ordinances as necessary to cover 
emergencies or special conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from ex-
ceeding maximum speed limits; 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specif-
ically authorized by this chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain 
any official traffic-control device at any location 
which requires the traffic on any state highway to 
stop before entering or crossing any intersecting 
highway unless approval in writing has first been 
obtained from the Department of Transportation. 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), 
(e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m), (n), (p), or (r) is not effective 
until official traffic-control devices giving notice of 
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the 
entrances to the highway or part of i t affected as is 
appropriate. 1997 
41-6-17.5. Private roads and parking areas. 
(1) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordi-
nance provide that privately-owned and main-
tained roads or parking areas within the city or 
county, as described in the ordinance, are subject 
to this chapter, provided: 
(i) the roads or parking areas are gener-
ally held open for use of the public for pur-
poses of vehicular travel or parking to serve 
commercial establishments; 
(ii) the privately-owned and maintained 
road is so connected with a highway that the 
public would not reasonably be able to deter-
mine that it is a privately-owned and main-
tained road; or 
(iii) a majority of the owners of the pri-
vately owned and maintained road have 
signed a petition and submitted it to the mu-
nicipality or county, requesting that the road 
be included in an ordinance enacted under 
this section. 
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under 
this subsection without a public hearing and 
without the agreement of the owner of the pri-
vately-owned and maintained highway or park-
ing area involved. 
(2) The department is not required under this sec-
tion to patrol or enforce any provisions of this chapter 
on any privately-owned and maintained road or park-
ing area, but is required to enforce those provisions of 
this chapter applicable to private property other than 
under this section. 1S68 
41-6-18. Right of real property owner to regu-
late traffic. 
This chapter does not prevent the owner of real 
property used by the public for purposes of vehicular 
travel by permission of the owner and not as matter 
of right from prohibiting the use, or from requiring 
other or different or additional conditions other than 
those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regulat-
ing the use as preferred by the owner, except as may 
be required under Section 41-6-17.5. 1988 
41-6-19. Removal of plants or other obstruc-
tions impairing v iew — Notice to 
owner — Penalty. 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from 
his property any tree, plant, shrub, or other obstruc-
tion, or part of it, which, by obstructing the view of 
any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard. 
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any 
local authority determines upon the basis of an engi-
neering and traffic investigation that a traffic hazard 
exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the 
hazard be removed within ten days. 
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(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic 
hazard within ten days is a class C misdemeanor. 
1907 
41-6-19.10. Repealed. 1979 
ARTICLE 3 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS 
41-6-20. Manual and specifications for uniform 
system of traffic-control devices . 
(1) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a 
manual and specifications for a uniform system of 
traffic-control devices consistent with the provisions 
of this chapter for use upon highways within this 
state. The manual shall correlate with and where 
possible conform to the system set forth in the most 
recent revised edition of the "Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways" 
and other standards issued or endorsed by the Fed-
eral Highway Administrator. 
(2) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a 
manual and specifications for a uniform system of 
traffic-control devices for school crossing zones, which 
shall supplement Par t VII of the manual adopted un-
der Subsection (1). 1987 
41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state 
h ighways — Restrictions o n local au-
thorities. 
(1) The Department of Transportation shall place 
and maintain traffic-control devices in conformance 
with its manual and specifications upon all state 
highways as it finds necessary to indicate and to 
carry out the provisions of this chapter or to regulate, 
warn, or guide traffic. 
(2) A local authority may not place or maintain 
any traffic-control device upon any highway under 
the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation 
except by the latter^s permission. 1987 
41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon local 
h ighways by local authorities. 
Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, 
shall place and maintain official traffic-control de-
vices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they 
find necessary to indicate and to carry out the provi-
sions of this chapter or local traffic ordinances, or to 
regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All traffic-control de-
vices erected under this section shall conform to and 
be maintained in conformance with the Department 
of Transportation manual and specifications for a 
uniform system of traffic-control devices under Sec-
tion 41-6-20. 1987 
41-6-23. Obeying devices — Effect of improper 
posit ion, illegibility, or absence — Pre-
sumption of lawful placement and 
compliance with chapter. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle shall obey the instruc-
tions of any official traffic-control device placed or 
held in accordance with this chapter unless at the 
time otherwise directed by a peace officer, and subject 
to the exceptions granted the operator of an autho-
rized emergency vehicle. 
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which offi-
cial traffic-control devices are required, may not 
be enforced against an alleged violator if at the 
time and place of the alleged violation an official 
device is not in proper position and sufficiently 
legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant per-
son. 
(b) When a particular section does not state 
that official traffic-control devices are required, 
the section is effective even though no devices 
are erected or in place. 
(3) When official traffic-control devices are placed 
or held in a position approximately conforming to the 
requirements of this chapter, the devices are pre-
sumed to have been placed or held by the official act 
or direction of lawful authority, unless the contrary is 
established by competent evidence. 
(4) An official traffic-control device placed or held 
under this chapter and purporting to conform to the 
lawful requirements pertaining to tha t device is pre-
sumed to comply with the requirements of this chap-
ter, unless the contrary is established by competent 
evidence. 1987 
41-6-24. Traffic-control s ignal — At intersec-
t ions — At p lace other than intersec-
t ion — Color of l ight signal. 
(1) When traffic is controlled by a traffic-control 
signal exhibiting different colored lights, or color 
lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combi-
nation, only the colors green, red, and yellow may be 
used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying a 
word legend. The lights shall indicate and apply to 
operators of vehicles and pedestrians as provided in 
this section. 
(2) "Green" indicates: 
(a) Veliicular traffic facing a circular green 
signal may proceed straight through or turn 
right or left unless a sign at that place prohibits 
either turn. But the vehicular traffic, including 
vehicles turning right or left, shall yield the 
right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians 
lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent 
crosswalk at the time the signal is exhibited. 
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow sig-
nal shown alone or in combination with other 
indication, may cautiously enter the intersection 
only to make the movement indicated by the 
arrow or other movement as is permitted by 
other indications shown at the same time. The 
vehicular traffic shall yield the right-of-way to 
pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent cross-
walk and to other traffic lawfully using the inter-
section. 
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-
control signal under Section 41-6-25, pedestrians 
facing any green signal except when the sole 
green signal is a turn arrow may proceed across 
the roadway within any marked or unmarked 
crosswalk. 
(3) Steady "Yellow" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular 
yellow or yellow arrow signal'is warned that the 
"Red" signal will be exhibited next. 
(b) Pedestrians facing a steady circular yellow 
or yellow arrow signal, unless otherwise directed 
by a pedestrian-control signal under Section 
41-6-25 are advised that there is insufficient time 
to cross the roadway before a red indication is 
shown, and no pedestrian may then start to cross 
the roadway. 
(4) Steady "Red" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal 
alone shall stop before entering the intersection 
at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before 
entering the crosswalk on the near side of the 
intersection and shall remain stopped until an 
indication to proceed is shown, except as provided 
in Subsection (4)(c). 
41-6-49 MOTOR VEHICLES 560 
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways 
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare 
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be 
different than the prima facie speed permitted under 
this chapter for an urban district. ' * 
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective 
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected 
upon the highway. 
(4) The Department of Transportation determines 
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high-
ways whether the highways are within or without the 
corporate limits of any city. 1987 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a 
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of traffic except when: 
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe opera-
tion; 
(b) upon a grade; or 
(c) in compliance with official traffic control 
devices. 
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled ac-
cess highway at less than the lawful maximum speed 
side by side with and at the same speed as a vehicle 
operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evi-
dence of impeding or blocking normal movement of 
traffic. 
(3) When the Department of Transportation or lo-
cal authorities within their respective jurisdictions 
determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that slow speeds on any part of a high-
way consistently impede the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic, the Department of Transporta-
tion or local authority may determine and shall post a 
minimum speed limit below which no person may op-
erate a vehicle except when necessary for safe opera-
tion. 1967 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges — Prima 
facie evidence. 
( D A person may not operate a vehicle over any 
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a 
highway at a speed which is greater than the maxi-
mum speed which may be maintained with safety on 
the bridge or structure, when the structure is 
signposted under this section. 
(2) The Department of Transportation upon re-
quest from any local authority shall, or upon its own 
initiative, may conduct an investigation of any bridge 
or other elevated structure which is a part of a high-
way. If it finds the structure may not with safety 
withstand vehicles traveling at the speed otherwise 
permissible under this chapter, the Department of 
Transportation shall determine the maximum speed 
of vehicles which, the structure can withstand, and 
shall cause or permit suitable signs stating the maxi-
mum speed to be erected and maintained before each 
end of the structure. 
(3) Upon the trial of a person charged with a viola-
tion of this section, proof of the determination of the 
maximum speed by the Department of Transporta-
tion and the existence of the signs constitute conclu-
sive evidence of the maximum speed which may be 
maintained with safety on the bridge or structure. 
1967 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway 
— Barricade or obstruction. 
(1) A person may not engage** any motor vehicle 
speed contest or exhibition of speed on a highway or 
aid or abet in any motor vehicle speed contest or exhi-
bition on any highway. 
(2) A person may not, for the purpose of facilitating 
or aiding or as an incident to any motor vehicle speed 
contest upon a highway, in any manner obstruct or 
place any barricade or obstruction or assist or partici-
pate in placing any barricade or obstruction upon any 
highway. 1987 
41-6-52. Speed violation — Complaint — Civil 
negligence. 
(1) In every charge of violation of any speed provi-
sion of this article, the complaint and the summons or 
notice to appear shall specify the speed at which the 
defendant is alleged to have operated a vehicle, also 
the prima facie speed applicable within the district or 
at the location. 
(2) The provisions of this article declaring prima 
facie speed limitations do not relieve the plaintiff in 
any civil action from the burden of proving negli-
gence on the part of the defendant as the proximate 
cause of an accident. vm 
41-6-52.1. Repealed. i t » 
ARTICLE 7 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING 
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, 
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND 
OTHER RULES OF THE 
ROAD 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of 
roadway — Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle 
shall be operated upon the right half of the roadway, 
except: 
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehi-
cle proceeding in the same direction under the 
rules governing that movement; 
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the 
vehicle to the left of the center of the roadway, 
but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to 
all vehicles traveling in the proper direction 
upon the unobstructed portions of the highway 
within a distance constituting an immediate haz-
ard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked 
lanes for traffic under the applicable rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for 
one-way traffic. 
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding at less 
than the normal speed of traffic under the existing 
conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane 
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to 
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway, except 
when overtaking and passing another vehicle pro-
ceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a 
left turn at an intersection or into a private road or 
driveway. i987 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in oppo-
site directions. 
Operators of vehicles proceeding in opposite direc-
tions shall pass each other to the right. On roadways 
having width for not more than one line of traffic in 
each direction, each operator shall give to the other a t 
least one-half of the main traveled portion of the 
roadway as nearly as possible. 1987 
41-6-55. Overtaking and pass ing vehicles pro-
ceeding in same direction. 
The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding 
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transportation of school children, shall bear upon 
the front and rear of the bus a plainly visible sign 
containing the words "school bus" in letters not 
less than eight inches in height, which shall be 
removed or covered when the vehicle is not in use 
for the transportation of school children. 
(b) Every school bus, when operated for the 
transportation of school children, shall be 
equipped with alternating flashing amber and 
red light signals visible from the front and rear, 
of a type approved and mounted ,as prescribed by 
the department. 
(2) The operator of any vehicle upon a highway, 
upon meeting or overtaking any school bus equipped 
with signals required imder this section which is dis-
playing alternating flashing amber warning light 
signals, shall slow his vehicle, but may proceed past 
the school bus using due care and caution at a speed 
not greater than specified in Subsection 41-6-46(2) for 
school zones for the safety of the school children that 
may be in the vicinity. If a school bus is displaying 
alternating flashing red light signals visible from the 
front or rear, all approaching or overtaking vehicles 
on the same roadway shall stop immediately before 
reaching the bus and may not proceed until the flash-
ing red light signals cease operation. The operator of 
a vehicle need not stop upon meeting or passing a 
school bus traveling in the opposite direction when: 
(a) traveling upon a divided highway; 
(b) the bus is stopped at an intersection or 
other place controlled by an official traffic-con-
trol device or peace officer; or 
(c) upon a highway of five or more lanes, 
which may include a left-turn lane or two-way 
left turn lane. 
(3) (a) The operator of a school bus shall operate 
alternating flashing red light signals a t all times 
when children are unloading from a school bus to 
cross a highway, or when a school bus is stopped 
for the purpose of loading children who must 
cross a highway to board the bus, or a t any other 
time when it would be hazardous for vehicles to 
proceed past the stopped school bus. 
(b) The alternating flashing red light signals 
may not be operated except when the school bus 
is stopped for loading or unloading school chil-
dren or for any emergency purpose. 1967 
ARTICLE 14 
STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING 
41-6-101. Stopping or parking on roadway out* 
side business or residential district. 
Outside a business or residence district no person 
shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, 
whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway 
when it is practical to stop, park, or so leave such 
vehicle off the roadway, but in every event an unob-
structed width of the highway opposite a standing 
vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehi-
cles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be 
available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction 
upon such roadway. 
This section and Sections 41-6-103 and 41-6-104 
shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is 
disabled while on the paved or main traveled portion 
of a roadway in such manner and to such extent that 
it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily 
leaving such disabled vehicle in such position. 1978 
41-6-102. Police officer authorized to move vehi-
cle. 
(1) Whenever any police officer finds a vehicle in 
violation of Section 41-6-101 such officer is hereby 
authorized to move such vehicle, or require the driver 
or other person in charge of the vehicle to move the 
same, to a position off the roadway. 
(2) Any
 kpo lice officer is authorized to remove or 
cause to be removed to a place of safety any unat-
tended vehicle illegally left standing upon any high-
way, bridge, causeway or in any tunnel in such posi-
tion or under such circumstances as to obstruct the 
normal movement of traffic. 
(3) Any police officer is authorized to remove or 
cause to be removed to the nearest garage or other 
place of safety any vehicle found upon a highway 
when: 
(a) Report has been made that such vehicle 
has been stolen or taken without the consent of 
its owner, or 
(b) The person or persons in charge of such ve-
hicle are unable to provide for its custody or re-
moval, or 
(c) When the person driving or in control of 
such vehicle is arrested for an alleged offense for 
which the officer is required by law to take the 
person arrested before a proper magistrate with-
out unnecessary delay. 1978 
41-6-103. Standing or parking vehicles — Re-
strictions and exceptions. 
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other 
traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of 
a police officer or official traffic-control device, no per-
son shall: 
(1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle: 
(a) on the roadway side of any vehicle 
stopj^ed or parked at the edge or curb of a 
street; 
(b) on a sidewalk; 
(c) within an intersection; 
(d) on a crosswalk; 
(e) between a safety zone and the adjacent 
curb or within 30 feet of points on the curb 
immediately opposite the ends of a safety 
zone, unless a different length is indicated by 
signs or markings; 
(f > alongside or opposite any street excava-
tion or obstruction when stopping, standing, 
or parking would obstruct traffic; 
(g;) upon any bridge or other elevated 
structure upon a highway or within a high-
way tunnel; 
(h) on any railroad tracks; 
(i) on any controlled-access highway, 
0*) in the area between roadways of a di-
vided highway, including crossovers; 
(k) any place where official traffic-control 
devices prohibit stopping. 
(2) Stand or park a vehicle, whether occupied 
or not, except momentarily to pick up or dis-
charge a passenger or passengers: 
(a) in front of a public or private driveway; 
(lb) within 15 feet of a fire hydrant; 
(c) within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an in-
tersection; 
(d) within 30 feet upon the approach to 
any flashing signal, stop sign, yield sign or 
traffic-control signal located at the side of a 
roadway; 
(e) within 20 feet of the driveway entrance 
to any fire station and on the side of a street 
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opposite the entrance to any fire station 
within 75 feet of said entrance when prop-
erly signposted; 
(f) at any place where official traffic-con-
trol devices prohibit standing. 6 
(3) Park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, 
except temporarily for the purpose of and while 
actually engaged in loading or unloading prop-
erty or passengers: 
(a) within 50 feet of the nearest rail of a 
railroad crossing; 
(b) at any place where official traffic-con-
trol devices prohibit parking. 
(4) No person shall move a vehicle not lawfully 
under such person's control into any prohibited 
area or an unlawful distance from the curb. 1978 
41-6-104. Stopping or parking upon roadways 
— Angle parking — Traffic-control de-
vices prohibiting or restricting. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
every vehicle stopped or parked upon a two-way road-
way shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand 
wheels parallel to and within twelve inches of the 
right-hand curb or as close as practicable to the right 
edge of the right-hand shoulder. 
(2) Except when otherwise provided by local ordi-
nance, every vehicle stopped or parked upon a one-
way roadway shall be stopped or parked parallel to 
the curb or edge of the roadway in the direction of 
authorized traffic movement with its right-hand 
wheels within twelve inches of the right-hand curb or 
as close as practicable to the right edge of the right-
hand shoulder or with its left-hand wheels within 
twelve inches of the left-hand curb or as close as prac-
ticable to the left edge of the left-hand shoulder. 
(3) Local authorities may by ordinance permit an-
gle parking on any roadway, except that angle park-
ing shall not be permitted on any federal-aid or state 
highway unless the Department of Transportation 
has determined that the roadway is of sufficient 
width to permit angle parking without interfering 
with the free movement of traffic. 
(4) The Department of Transportation with respect 
to highways under its jurisdiction may place traffic-
control devices prohibiting or restricting the stop-
ping, standing, or parking of vehicles on any highway 
where in its opinion such stopping, standing, or park-
ing is dangerous to those using the highway or where 
the stopping, standing, or parking of vehicles would 
unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. 
No person shall stop, stand, or park any vehicle in 
violation of the restriction indicated by such devices. 
1978 
ARTICLE 15 
MISCELLANEOUS RULES 
41-6-105. Motor vehicle left unattended — Re-
quirements. 
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle 
shall permit it to stand unattended without first stop-
ping the engine, locking the ignition and removing 
the key, placing the transmission in "park" or the 
gears in "low" or "reverse" if the vehicle has a man-
ual shift, or effectively setting the brakes thereon; 
and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, turn-
ing the front wheels to the curb or side of the high-
l y . 1969 
41-6-106. Backing — When permissible. 
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same 
unless such movement can be made with safety and 
without interfering with other traffic. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not back the same 
upon any shoulder or roadway of any limited-access 
roadway. 1975 
41-6-106.10. Sidewalk — Driving prohibited — 
Exception. 
No person shall drive any vehicle upon a sidewalk 
or sidewalk area except upon a permanent or duly 
authorized or temporary driveway. 1975 
41-6-107. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle — 
Place for operator to ride — Passen-
gers. 
(a) A person operating a motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle shall ride only upon the permanent and 
regular seat attached thereto and such operator shall 
not carry any other person nor shall any other person 
ride on a motorcycle or a motor-driven cycle unless 
such vehicle is designed to carry more than one per-
son, in which event a passenger may ride upon the 
permanent and regular seat, if designed for two per-
sons, or upon another seat firmly attached to the mo-
torcycle or motor-driven cycle at the rear or side of 
the operator. 
(b) A person shall ride upon a motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle only while sitting astride the seat, facing 
forward, with one leg on either side of the motorcycle 
or motor-driven cycle. 
(c) No person shall operate a motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle while carrying any package, bundle, or 
other article which prevents him from keeping both 
hands on the handlebars. 
(d) No operator shall carry any person, nor shall 
any person ride, in a position tha t will interfere with 
the operation or control of the motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle or the view of the operator. 1969 
41-6-107.2. Motorcycles, motor-driven cycles, or 
all-terrain type I vehicles — Operation 
on public highways. 
(1) All motorcycles and motor-driven cycles are en-
titled to full use of a lane and no motor vehicle may 
be driven in a manner so as to deprive any motorcycle 
or motor-driven cycle of the full use of a lane. This 
subsection does not apply to motorcycles or motor-
driven cycles operated two abreast in a single lane. 
(2) The operator of a motorcycle or motor-driven 
cycle may not overtake and pass in the same lane 
occupied by the vehicle being overtaken. 
(3) No person may operate a motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle between lanes of traffic, or between adja-
cent lines or rows of vehicles. 
(4) Motorcycles or motor-driven', cycles may not be 
operated more than two abreast in a single lane. 
(5) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to police 
officers in the performance of their official duties. 
(6) The provisions of this section also apply to all-
terrain type I vehicles. 1987 
41-6-107.4. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle — 
Attaching to another vehicle prohib-
ited. 
No person riding upon a motorcycle or motor-
driven cycle shall at tach himself to any other vehicle 
on a roadway. 1969 
41-6-107.6. M o t o r ^ c l e or motor-driven cycle — 
Footrests' for passenger — Height of 
handlebars limited. 
(a) Any motorcycle or motor-driven vehicle carry-
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